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WHEN DOES MIGHT MAKE RIGHT? USING FORCE FOR REGIME
CHANGE

John Linarelli∗

The aim of this paper is to identify the moral grounds for the use of armed force by
one state or a group of states, against a state (the “target state”), when the intention of the
intervening state(s) is to achieve a fundamental change in the character of the political
and legal institutions of the target state. To put the question within a liberal context, is a
state or a collectivity of states ever justified, or indeed even obligated, to use force to
assist in bringing democracy and rule of law to another state? Despite its imprecision and
its ubiquitous use in the political science literature, I use “regime change” as shorthand to
describe the use of armed force whose moral justification is investigated here.1 My
limitation of the regime change terminology helps to make it more precise, in the sense
that I use it only to refer to cases in which regime change is the actual reason for the
military intervention, not the consequence of it.2 To avoid any difficulties associated
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This paper was presented as a work in progress at the Association of American Law Schools Mid-Year
Meeting in Vancouver, B.C., Canada, June 17-20, 2007. I am grateful to Mary Ellen O’Connell for
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1
Michael Walzer uses the term in the preface to the latest edition of Just and Unjust Wars. Michael
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic 4th ed. 2006), p. ix. Allen Buchanan uses “forcible
democratization.” Allen Buchanan, “Institutionalizing the Just War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 34(1)
(2006), pp. 2-38. I do no use Buchanan’s phrase because I want to be clear that force in my account is not
to be used to compel democracy but to force bad governments to allow their peoples to govern themselves
justly. In using the different terminology I intend to provide no commentary on the merits on Buchanan’s
account.
2
In the preface of the latest edition of Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer distinguishes between cause and
consequence. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. ix-x. Of course, the “cause’ terminology has its origins in
just war theory and traces back to Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Fathers English
Dominican Province trans. (Christian Classics 1981), Part II, Question 40.

with accessing the intentions or motives of collectivities and their leaders, I refer to
reasons for action that governments rely on to use force.
The question posed has obvious relevance to current affairs. The actual yet perhaps
not fully articulated justification for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq was regime change.
The characteristics of the Saddam Hussein regime made all the difference. Many states
have weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including the United States itself, its
coalition partners, and its NATO allies, but the US government does not consider WMDs
in these states as a justification for invasion.3 As Walzer explains, “it was the character
of the regime that made Iraq dangerous: The US government claimed that Saddam’s
regime was inherently aggressive and inherently murderous. Just as it had committed
aggression in the past, so it had massacred its own people in the past, and American
leaders insisted that, in this case, the past was prologue. What happened before would
happen again unless the regime was replaced.”4 For those who object to the 2003 Iraq
war and ensuing occupation, their objections seem to come from a moral conviction that
using force to accomplish regime change is illegitimate, that it causes too much harm and
that peaceful alternatives ought to be pursued. I seek to clarify those convictions here.
Having narrowed the question to one of “regime change intervention,” I must
acknowledge that in the non-ideal world it is difficult to separate reasons for action and
the consequences of those reasons. Moreover, governments often have more than one
reason for using force. A mixture of reasons to support intervention has historically been
a central feature of government decision-making.5

A question closer to the way

governments make policy might be framed as which reason predominates or what is the
operative reason, apart from the political rhetoric, for the intervention. I have opted to
state the question as I have for purposes of clarity and precision.

3

Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. xii-xiii.
Ibid.
5
Ibid., p. 101; Jane Stromseth. David Wippman & Rosa Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? Building the
Rule of Law After Military Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006), p. 3: “Frequently,
of course, the motives behind military interventions will be complex and mixed. . . . In the age of
globalization, there can often be no neat distinctions between “humanitarian” concerns and “security”
concerns.”
4

2

Regardless of the reasons governments offer to justify the use of force, they often
engage in post-conflict reconstruction.6 Key to post-conflict reconstruction is efforts to
bring rule of law, constitutional reform and democracy to the target state. In all of these
cases, some entity, usually the intervener’s government, viewed a return to the status quo
as unacceptable.

The interveners may value law and democracy instrumentally, as

necessary to produce a state that values peace and pursues peaceful relations with
neighbors and within the broader international community.7 But an instrumental view is
not the only view and the argument for bringing institutions of justice to a state, or at
least assisting in doing so, could certainly be seen as having a deontological justification.8
In their recent book on the military intervention – rule of law connection, Can Might
Make Rights: Building the Rule of Law after Military Intervention, legal scholars Jane
Stromseth, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks bring to our attention that forcing people to
6

Stromseth, Wippman & Brooks, Can Might Make Rights provide the details of post-conflict
reconstruction from the 1990s onwards.
7
Empirical political science literature informs that democratic states tend not to start armed conflicts. See,
e.g, Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton
University Press 1993); John Oneal & Bruce M. Russett, “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy,
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985, International Studies Quarterly 41(2) (1997): 267-294: Zeev
Moav & Bruce M. Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986” The
American Political Science Review 87(3) (1993): 624-638. The literature is discussed in John Linarelli,
“Peacebuilding,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 24 (1996): 253-283.
8
A Kantian approach values peace noninstrumentally, as respect for the dignity of persons. In Perpetual
Peace, Kant’s first definitive article for perpetual peace is that the constitutions of every state must be
republican. Kant explains:
the republican constitution does offer the prospect of the result wished for, namely
perpetual peace; the ground of this is as follows. When the consent of the citizens of a
state is required in order to decide whether there shall be war or not (and it cannot be
otherwise in this constitution), nothing is more natural than that they will be very hesitant
to begin such a bad game, since they would have to decide to take upon themselves all
the hardships of war (such as themselves doing the fighting and paying the costs of the
war from their own belongings, painfully making good the devastation it leaves behind
them, and finally – to make the cup of troubles overflow- a burden of debt that embitters
peace itself, and that can never be paid off because of new wars always impending); on
the other hand, under a constitution in which subjects are not citizens of the state, which
is therefore not republican, [deciding upon war] is the easiest thing in the world; because
the head of state is not a member of the state but its proprietor and gives up nothing at all
of his feasts, hunts, pleasure palaces, court festivals, and so forth, he can decide upon
war, as upon a kind of pleasure party, for insignificant cause, and can with indifference
leave the justification of the war, for the sake of propriety, to the diplomatic corps, which
is always ready to provide it.
Immanuel Kant, “Perpectual Peace,” in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosoophy, Mary J. Gregor trans. &
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), pp. 323-324. The empirical political science literature
could be said to vindicate Kant’s insights. See Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and SelfDetermination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004).
Buchanan characterizes Kant’s point as the “Democratic Peace Hypothesis,” which, he says, “recent liberal
theorists” have revived. See also Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. xi.

3

become democratic and liberal seems like something in the nature of a contradiction.9
How do we force people to accept rule of law, democratic order, and principles of
justice? Worse still, what if the intervention is of dubious legality, as was the 2003
invasion of Iraq?10 To borrow from Kant very loosely here, actions of the sort taken in
Iraq suggest to us a contradiction in conception: we certainly should not be able to will a
general principle in which states may use illegal force to promote rule of law. Stromseth,
Wippman and Brooks explain that their book “is less concerned with political and legal
theory than with what seems to work on the ground, and what does not.”11

They

continue: “nonetheless, when it comes to creating ‘the rule of law’ in post-intervention
settings, we are convinced that understanding what does and doesn’t work requires some
basic historical and theoretical insights.”12 The aim of this paper is to provide what
lawyers would characterize as theoretical insights, though a better characterization would
be as what philosophers characterize as conceptual and normative-explanatory insights.13
I cannot provide these insights for the entire book, but rather identify the moral
conditions for one sort of military intervention.
A well-developed literature exists on when it is morally permissible for a state to use
armed force. My account differs from these in three ways. First, I develop the moral
requirements for using force to bring about or more accurately, to assist citizens in the
target state in bringing about, regime change.14 About as close as the literature gets to
dealing with my question is in addressing the moral justification for humanitarian
9

Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks at p. 312 explain:
The rule of law elevates reason over force and rights over mere might. This creates a
difficult irony. Regardless of the specific background to any given intervention,
interveners have the capacity to intervene for one overriding reason: the possession of
superior military might.” They continue: “But even when a particular intervention is
widely seen as legitimate, the fact remains that on the ground, interveners are present
because they have greater military power than other contenders. From Bosnia to East
Timor to Afghanistan and Iraq, interveners are in a position to promote the rule of law
mainly because they have a superior capacity to capture, disable, or kill most of those
who get in the way. Although they may not possess a complete monopoly on the use of
force, they certainly have the biggest guns on the block, and they can use those guns,
directly or indirectly, to coerce local actors into cooperating with rule of law initiatives.
10
For various views on the legality of the 2003 Iraq war, see “Agora: Future Implications of The Iraq
Conflict,” American Journal Of International Law 97(3) (2003), pp. 553-642.
11
Stromseth, Wippman & Brooks, Can Might Make Rights?, p. 10.
12
Ibid.
13
See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986) pp. 65-66.
14
Throughout, I use the term “citizen” to refer to the populations of states. My intention is not to convey
any additional meaning in the use of the term.
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intervention to stop or prevent imminent violations of basic human rights. As I explain
below, the grounds for humanitarian intervention come from what I identify as the
Human Rights Principle. I rule out the Human Rights Principle as providing reasons for
using force to bring about regime change. Instead, I develop a Self Governance Principle
as the grounds for regime change intervention. Second, almost all of the literature to-date
conceptualizes moral reasons for use of force as a rights, justifications or permissions. I
take a different approach, developing the notion of an obligation or duty to use force –
and on contexts in which no such obligation exists.15 I agree with Onora O’Neill that
“the most significant structures of ethical concern can be expressed in linked webs of
requirements, which are better articulated by beginning from the perspective of agents
and their obligations rather than that of claimants and their rights.”16 The focus is dual,
on the obligations of intervening states to protect foreigners and the obligations of
intervening states to protect their own citizens from harm. The obligation I describe is
collective; it is an obligation of individual states but it can only be accomplished
collectively, through international institutions.

Third, my approach focuses on the

necessary conditions for bringing a new legal and constitutional order to the target state.
Incorporating conditions for success does not entail only the calculation of costs and
benefits.

The account is grounded in deontological and interpretive considerations.

Incorporating success conditions into the account helps to make the duty one that goes
beyond the familiar weaknesses in duties of beneficence.
My account shares affinities with David Luban’s limiting principle on humanitarian
intervention, which he sets forth in his paper on the Kosovo intervention: “If the
aftermath of intervention is anarchy or an unstable truce, the war should be waged only if
the interveners are prepared for a lengthy occupation or an exercise in state building.”17

15

I use the terms “duty” and “obligation” interchangeably. My aim is to understand whether a moral duty
exists to intervene to bring about regime change, and if so, the conditions for that moral duty to arise. KokChor Tan takes a similar approach to these terms in his paper on humanitarian intervention, “The Duty to
Protect,” in Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams, Nomos XLVII Humanitarian Intervention (New York:
New York University Press 2006), pp. 84-116, 112 n. 1.
16
Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1996), p. 4.
17
David Luban, “Intervention and Civilization: Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo War,” in Pablo de
Greiff & Ciaran Cronin, Global Justice and Transnational Politics (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 2002), p.
79-115, 89.
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To Luban, a “crucial point” is “no follow-through, no intervention.”18 He concludes,
“otherwise, interventions are like tossing a life jacket to a shipwrecked victim but then
leaving the victim adrift in the middle of the ocean.”19 My case differs from Luban’s in
that Luban is accounting for consequences, not when the motivating reason for the force
is regime change. Unlike Luban, I seek an obligation in the first instance for throwing
the lifejacket, but his casting of principles in moral terms gives us hints on how to
construct a moral theory to support regime change intervention.
Suppressing a great deal of law and institutional detail, we can summarize the three
main legal grounds for military intervention as self-defense, threats to international peace
and security, and humanitarian grounds.20 The third ground – humanitarian intervention
– is the subject of ongoing legal controversy. Law is, after all a normative order located
within institutions, and from an institutional perspective, it is a disputed legal point
whether interventions solely for humanitarian reasons require UN Security Council
action.21
Many view the international law on the use of force, and international law in other
areas, as morally inadequate. The inadequacies at least partly stem from the normative
grip of sovereignty on international law. As Luban explains, sovereignty is not a moral
concept.22 Since international law in its current form respects the notion of sovereignty,
it comes as hardly a surprise that from a moral standpoint, a deep dissatisfaction with
international law persists.23

This dissatisfaction will persist until international law

includes a morally sensitive notion of state legitimacy. This paper tries to expose the
fault lines of the dissatisfaction in the law when it comes to the question of military

18

Ibid.
Ibid.
20
See UN Charter Art. 51, Chap. VII; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2nd ed. 2004).
21
Simon Chesterrman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001), chap. 2.
22
David Luban, “Just War and Human Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 9(2) 1980, pp. 160-181.
23
In his Inaugural Lecture at the University of Cambridge, James Crawford argues that “it is hardly
surprising that under international law (apart from treaties), there was no general endorsement of a
principle of democracy. Crawford identifies six features of “classical” international law that “were deeply
undemocratic, or at least were capable of operating in a deeply undemocratic way.” James Crawford,
“Democracy and the Body of International Law,” in Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., Democratic
Governance and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), pp. 91-113.
19
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intervention as part of a strategy to bring legitimacy to states through legal and
democratic reform.
The grounds I elucidate below may be used to inform international law but they
cannot be directly transposed into legal principles.24 When it comes to understanding the
law-morality connection, I accept the view that moral principles serve a function like that
posited by Ronald Dworkin and T.M. Scanlon.25 States, moreover, just might have an
obligation to reform international law so that it conforms to moral principles.26
It may seem that I give short shrift to institutions, and in particular to the role of the
UN Security Council. That is not my intention. Security Council action presupposes a
threat to international peace and security, the grundnorm for Security Council action.27
One of the questions explored below is whether there should be grounds apart from threat
to international peace and security for the use of force. To state the question more
precisely, one of the questions explored below is whether there should be grounds for
using force in which no threat to international peace and security serves as justification. I
explore moral reasons directly and avoid resort to a separate standard – threat to
international peace and security – for justification. The account below may inform U.N.
practice or Charter revision.

My main concern is with coming up with normative

principles that go beyond the Charter, which may inform Charter revisions.
24

I employ the strategy Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz describe as follows:
It is assumed throughout that states and international law should recognize [a right of
self-determination only if there is a sound moral case for it. This does not mean that
international law should mirror morality. Its concern is with setting standards that enjoy
the sort of clarity required to make them the foundations of international relations
between states and fit for recognition and enforcement through international organs.
These concerns give rise to special considerations that should be fully recognized in the
subtle process of applying moral principles to the law. The derivation of legal principles
from the moral premises is never a matter of copying morality into law. Still, the
justification of the law rests ultimately on moral considerations, and therefore those
considerations should also help shape the contours of legal principles.
Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, “National Self-Determination,” The Journal of Philosophy 87(9), p. 439461, 439.
25
Scanlon’s excellent treatment of these questions is in T.M. Scanlon, “The Aims and Authority of Moral
Theory,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 12(1): 1-23.
26
See in particular Allen Buchanan’s Illegal Legal Reform Justification, in Allen Buchanan, “Reforming
the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention” in J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane,
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 2003), pp. 130-173. An excellent study of how customary international law is formed is O.A. Elias &
C.L. Lim, The Paradox of Consensualism in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International
1998).
27
UN Charter Arts. 2(4), 39, 42.
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Nothing said here is intended to suggest that military force should be used under any
circumstances other than as a last resort. Legal reformers advocating a change in the
legal principles towards responsibility to protect have consistently maintained that
military force should be the option of last resort.28 I accept these arguments as sound and
they merit no further discussion here.

I.

REGIME CHANGE AS HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

An intuitive place for lawyers to locate regime change intervention is in an expanded
version of humanitarian intervention. Lawyers state the putative legal justification of
humanitarian intervention in the Human Rights Principle: countries may use force to
protect “basic” human rights. This is the standard formulation that international lawyers
support in trying to carve out a third reason for use of force, beyond self-defense and
Security Council authorization.29

Ian Brownlie defines putatively permissible

humanitarian intervention as “the threat or use of armed force by a state, a belligerent
community, or an international organization, with the object of protecting human
rights.”30 Tighter definitions have been offered, to limit protection to only the most
“basic” of human rights or to stop the most serious of human rights violations, such as to
stop genocide. J. L. Holzgrefe provides a precise definition of humanitarian intervention
as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at
preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of
individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose
territory force is applied.”31 Rwanda and Sudan are examples of circumstances in which
humanitarian intervention was justified but failed to materialize.

Kosovo is often

suggested as an example of a humanitarian intervention, undertaken collectively by

28

See, e.g., Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibility (United Nations 2004), p. 67. For an explanation of these proposals, see Mary Ellen
O’Connell, “The Counter-Reformation of the Security Council,” Journal of International Law and
International Relations 2(1) 2007, pp. 207-221.
29
Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace, p. 1.
30
Ian Brownlie, “Humanitarian Intervention,” in John N. Moore ed., Law and Civil War in the Modern
World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1974), p. 217. The quote is found in Chesterman, Just
War or Just Peace, p. 1.
31
J.L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in Holzgrefe & Keohane, Humanitarian
Intervention, p. 18.
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NATO, though NATO members avoided the characterization, and the characterization
remains contested.32
The Human Rights Principle cannot support regime change intervention.

Its

conception of human rights is too restrictive to support regime change intervention.
Moreover, the scope of the Principle extends to the human rights relevant to regime
change only with great difficulty.
As for the restrictiveness of the Human Rights Principle, all commentators agree that
only the most fundamental of human rights justify humanitarian intervention. Luban
argues that the human rights that trigger intervention should be the “socially basic human
rights” of subsistence and security.33 Protecting these rights, however, does not call for
post-conflict reform.34 Indeed, what may be left in power is an illegitimate state by
Luban’s definition and by definitions of other moral theorists who have considered the
question.35 Michael Walzer’s approach contains similar limitations. One of Walzer’s
limited “rules of disregard” of sovereignty is when a government massacres, enslaves or
expels its segments of its population.36
Preventive humanitarian intervention might be an avenue to achieve regime change.
But the Human Rights Principle does not justify preventive humanitarian intervention or
at least not intervention when human rights violations are not imminent. 37 The common
understanding of the Human Rights Principle is that for it to do the work of justifying the
use of force, the atrocities must be ongoing or imminent at the time the force is used. If
32

See, Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks, pp. 35-39; Luban, “Intervention and Civilization: Some Unhappy
Lessons of the Kosovo War.”
33
David Luban, “The Romance of the Nation-State, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9(4) (1980), pp. 392397; David Luban, “Just War and Human Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 9(2) (1980), pp, 160-181.
34
I certainly do not argue that governments cannot engage in post-conflict reform after they have stopped
actual or prevented imminent human rights violations. I want to keep, however, the notions of cause and
consequence distinct. Post-conflict reform can be a consequence of humanitarian intervention.
35
Some influential accounts, however, provide the illegitimate states are not entitled to respect. A
canonical justice-based account is Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press). Beitz maintains that only states that conform to principles of justice are
autonomous sources of ends entitled to respect. Non-intervention doctrines apply only to these states.
Buchanan’s account is similar. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, pp. 233-247.
Buchanan maintains that only legitimate states are morally justified in exercising political power.
According to Buchanan, a state has such moral justification if and only if it credibly protects basic human
rights through processes that respect human rights.
36
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 90. Walzer later added expulsion when writing in response to critics.
Michael Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 9(3) (1980), pp. 209-229.
37
Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination, p. 443.
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the justification for the intervention is to prevent future non-imminent human rights
violations, then it is preventive in character. The aim of such intervention is that bringing
rule of law and democracy to a state will prevent the sorts of extraordinary human rights
abuses that humanitarian intervention is designed to stop, as well as bring about other
laudable behaviors. This is not humanitarian intervention, but intervention for purposes
of regime change.
Nor does the Human Rights Principle justify humanitarian intervention to remedy
past human rights violations.38 An intervention for such reasons again would be for the
purposes of regime change. The reason for the lack of connection between the Human
Rights Principle and intervention and past human rights violations is logically simple.
The Principle justifies use of force to stop human rights violations. If no human rights
violations are occurring, then no action by a state triggers its application. If no human
rights atrocities are occurring then the Human Rights Principle, which justifies
intervention to stop human rights atrocities, does not support humanitarian intervention.
If a state has in the past violated basic human rights on a massive scale, but no longer
does so, then the Human Rights Principle possibly justifies remedies other than regime
change, such as compensation paid to victims, truth commissions, criminal prosecutions
of the abusers, either domestically or internationally, and so on. These sorts of actions
are ongoing now, in, for example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission.
In sum, the reasons for the impermissibility of humanitarian intervention to remedy
past human rights abuses share similarities with reasons for the impermissibility of
humanitarian intervention to prevent future human rights abuses.

Both kinds of

interventions have regime change, not protecting vulnerable populations from
extraordinary human rights violations, as their main purpose.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a classic failure of the humanitarian intervention
justification on both these grounds. The only humanitarian justification the interveners in
Iraq (the US and the UK principally) could possibly cite to would have been to ongoing
and current mass atrocities being committed by Saddam Hussein and his regime. No
38

Ibid.
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mass atrocities were ongoing at the time, and the coalition did not cite a humanitarian
justification as a reason for the invasion, at least not directly or persuasively.39 The
interveners could not cite the mass atrocities for which Hussein was tried and hanged,
because he committed those in the early 1990s, and they thus could not serve as a
justification for military action in 2003. The interveners could not cite the probability of
future mass atrocities either. That would be preventive humanitarian intervention, which
is not permitted by the Human Rights Principle.
The only way to get the Human Rights Principle to do the work of providing reasons
for intervention for the purpose of regime change is to expand the coverage of “basic”
human rights protected by the Principle to include a right to democratic governance. We
would need to revise substantially the current form of the Human Rights Principle.
Some legal scholars have sought just such an expansion. The most sanguine view of
the state of international law at this time is that an “emerging right” or “emerging norm”
of democratic governance exists.40 If this emerging right is or becomes international law,
it might justify humanitarian intervention to bring about democracy and rule of law in a
target state. A number of legal scholars advocate such a right, but it seems clear that no
persistent and widely followed custom or opinio juris exist as yet. It is doubtful that a
rule of customary international law will “emerge” for some time.41 Some might say that
the putative norm reflects only an American view.42
To the extent the legal arguments are positivistic and source driven, moreover, they
may be too conventional to provide support for a moral account. A good deal of the
reasoning in the legal literature is conventional in nature.
39

Finding a customary

Though of course humanitarian reasons lurked in the political background. See the White House’s
background paper for the President, “A Decade of Deception and Defiance: Saddam Hussein’s Defiance of
the United Nations, Sept. 12, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/iraqdecade.pdf (last
viewed June 15, 2007). For a statement of the reasons for the invasion by government lawyers, see
William H Taft IV and Todd Buchwald, “International Law and the War in Iraq,” in “Agora: Future
Implications of The Iraq Conflict,” American Journal of International Law 97(3) (2003), pp. 553-642.
40
The origins of the discussion in the legal literature are in Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to
Democratic Governance,” American Journal of International Law 86(1) (1992): 46-91.
41
James Crawford sets out the canonical skeptical case in his Inaugural Lecture at the University of
Cambridge. James Crawford, “Democracy and the Body of International Law,” in Fox & Roth, pp. 91-120.
42
Crawford explains that “the idea has found at least some support from commentators within and even
outside the United States.” Ibid., p. 106. I taught in the UK for almost five years and I recall raising the
question of the emerging right of democratic governance in a meeting and receiving a dismissive rebuttal to
the effect, “that’s only something Americans are thinking about.” Regrettably, I cannot recall the details of
the discussion.
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international law norm is an exercise in both legal reasoning and political or sociological
analysis.

Human rights instruments and state practice, at both the multilateral and

regional levels, are surveyed, and in them are found the recognition in state practice of
various rights to political participation, from which we can make the argument,
inferentially, that an emerging right of democratic governance exists. The inferential
argument is that these sources express a widespread and uniform custom and sense of
obligation necessary for opinio juris. Such an account tells us about conventions that
exist in the global society of states, and they may assist empirically, in using a wide
reflective equilibrium procedure to revise the Human Rights Principle so that it does the
work of morally justifying using force in appropriate regime change cases. This is a far
more indirect approach than the one I propose below.
But it suggests a variation on a theme. A common set of circumstances in many
humanitarian interventions is that to stop the atrocities it is necessary to overthrow the
oppressive government and begin the installation of a new one.

This should have

occurred in Rwanda. Rwanda is a failure of the international community to act when
confronted with an overwhelming human rights disaster.

If there had been a

humanitarian intervention into Rwanda to stop the massacre of the Tutsis and protect
them from further harm, it would have been necessary to overthrow the Hutu regime. In
Kosovo, NATO intervened military in the mid-1990s to stop Serbian ethnic cleansing,
but “grave problems still remain” despite post-conflict reconstruction efforts by the
international community on a massive scale.43 In the non-ideal world, neat separations
of questions along conceptual lines rarely present themselves. It is sometimes difficult to
distinguish protecting vulnerable persons from atrocities and regime change. All of this
may be true, but it does not mean that we should avoid clarity in our grounds for using
force. Given that the Human Rights Principle in its present form requires that atrocities
must be ongoing or imminent at the moment of decision, it does not do the work of
justifying regime change either when no atrocities are ongoing or imminent or when
regime change is unnecessary to stop the atrocities. We need to a more finely grained
Principle. In sum, the Human Rights Principle in its present form does not justify regime
change as the animating purpose of the intervention.
43
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Finally, even if the Human Rights Principle could be revised to encompass a human
right to democratic governance, it does not follow that an obligation exists for states (or
their citizens) to provide the right to the citizens of other states. If a right to democratic
governance can be found in human rights conventions and state practice, then it seems
clear that states who fail to provide the right to their own citizens violate the human rights
of their own citizens, but it is by no means clear that other states violate the human rights
of the citizens of other states. It is the obligation of the state that is the possible target of
intervention to provide the right, not the state that is considering intervention. Again,
The Human Rights Principle does not do the work of justifying regime change
intervention.

II. REGIME CHANGE AS ITS OWN REASON
Avoiding the problems with the Human Rights Principle, I propose the Self
Governance Principle as moral justification for regime change intervention.44 The Self
Governance Principle is as follows: legitimate states (or their citizens) have a collective
obligation to intervene militarily in an illegitimate state (the “target state”) when a
substantial likelihood exists that (i) the population in the target state will form a new
government in a manner meeting the moral and conceptual conditions for self
determination, which includes the conversion of the target state into a legitimate state and
(ii) post-conflict reform will a bring about a legal system meeting the conceptual
conditions for the law to have practical authority to the target state’s population. If these
conditions are not met, states have an obligation to refrain from using force solely for
purposes of regime change. I specify below how the Self Governance Principle is
mandatory: it is in the nature of a duty of justice, not beneficence. It is obligatory not
supererogatory.
I could specify a third practical authority condition relating to international law, that
the use of armed force must meet widely accepted standards of international legality. But
44
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I think specification of these additional conditions might be circular, in that the above
conditions, if they inform the content of international law, will bring about compliance
with this third condition.
I accept Charles Beitz’s and Allen Buchanan’s notion of the source of legitimacy of a
state. To use Beitz’s formulation, “only states whose institutions satisfy appropriate
principles of justice can legitimately demand to be respected as autonomous sources of
ends.”45 Beitz is careful to explain that he does not specify the content of the principles
of justice that states should respect.46 In a footnote, he explains that he uses “appropriate
principles of justice” “to suggest that it is possible that different principles of justice may
apply to different types of societies in view of variations, e.g., in levels of socioeconomic
development.”47 Justice-based conceptions of state legitimacy, while controversial from
a legal perspective, are not controversial from a moral perspective. The idea of adhering
to principles of justice is just a way of saying that state institutions must respect each
citizen of the state. It is a deontologically based conception of the state, one that grounds
state legitimacy in principles of political morality. Beitz’s approach assists in avoiding
the problem of ignoring the fact of pluralism that Walzer brings out in Just and Unjust
Wars. Walzer’s concern with too narrow a definition of state legitimacy is we might fail
to respect historic communities within states.48
The Self Governance Principle provides that only legitimate states share in the
collective obligation to intervene. From a prudential standpoint, illegitimate states, under
the definitions I use, are too unstable to have responsibilities to intervene militarily in the
affairs of other states. From a moral standpoint, illegitimate states have no standing to
45
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use force. Beitz argues that states differ from natural persons, in that unlike natural
persons, states “lack the unity of consciousness and the rational will that constitute the
identity of persons.”49 It is a reason not to give illegitimate states autonomy because
natural persons deserve to be respected as autonomous sources of ends and protected
from such states.50

Hence, we can hold legitimate states to have obligations and

illegitimate states not to have them. The analogy to natural persons would be that
illegitimate states are not persons entitled to respect as persons.
The concept of state legitimacy applies across the board. In addition to the obligation
to use force inuring only to legitimate states, a moral necessity condition within the
notion of self determination is that the end-result of any intervention will be a legitimate
state. Legitimate states may use force only to assist in the creation of legitimate states.
This is not a controversial condition.
The self determination condition is Millian: the need for change must come from the
inside.51 To Mill, external force is never sufficient for producing the conditions for selfdetermination. Mill argued that political communities must seek their own freedom. I do
not go as far as Mill, however, with his stern doctrine of self-help. In my account, the
question whether political communities are in the process of seeking political freedom is
hermeneutical: whether outsiders can know when the conditions for self determination
exist. Though this condition is a difficult hurdle, there will be good cases. One of my
main relaxations of Millian principles is my argument that external force alone is never
sufficient for producing the conditions for self determination. The Self Governance
Principle permits external assistance when its conditions are met.
The self determination condition contained in the Self Governance Principle differs
from the usual conceptions. It takes territory and nationality as unalterable givens. State
integrity is accepted as is. I do not use the self determination terminology to refer to the
usual case in which it is used, that of secession. The Self Governance Principle does not
cover the case of separating out a group with a clear cultural, ethnic, or other identity for
self governance in their own state or in a kind of millet multiculturalist order within a
49
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state.52 The concern of the Self Governance Principle is in how states as they are
currently constituted may be made legitimate through the use of collective force from the
outside. It may seem odd that self determination, a moral concept, is subservient to the
non-moral, political concept of the sovereignty of an existing state. But the idea is
simple: all things being equal, citizens of a state are better off in an ethical sense, of being
able to live their plans of life more fully, if they can govern themselves justly. Legitimate
states have a moral duty to assist peoples living in unjust states to transform unjust
governments to just ones.
A way of understanding the notion of self determination as it is incorporated in the
Self Governance Principle is to break it into two parts: “self” and “determination.” As
for “self,” the focus is on a single identity that almost all persons have: political identity
with a state.53 The concern of the Self Governance Principle is, for example, on Iraqis or
Italians or Rwandans, not on Kurds or Sunnis or Shiites or Calabrese or Genoese or Hutu
or Tutsi. There may be other identities in the target state, but they do not matter either for
purposes of determining whether regime change intervention is morally justified.
Regime change matters for these other identities to the extent that a legitimate state
comes into existence that adheres to principles of justice and these principles provide
cultural, ethnic, religious, sexual, and other identities the circumstances in which to
flourish, but these other “sub-national” identities are not to be recognized in the first
instance in setting the conditions for regime change intervention. Recognizing the rights
of sub-national identities to self determination thus has a clear ethical component, but to
recognize their right as sufficient for self determination under the Self Governance
Principle would be to change the status of their identity as it is recognized in their
society. Their own society recognizes their identities as sub-national. To recognize a
sub-national identity as having a claim of national self determination is to convert a
demand for respect within a political community to one for secession, for respect as a
political community.

52
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Why do we care about self determination?

The answer lies in the concept of

selfhood. Many answers have been offered to this question, but mine is rooted in
liberalism: autonomy.54 Autonomy, in its fullest moral sense, recognizes persons as
deliberative, active agents. Autonomous persons are not passive, not mere responders to
incentives.

Autonomy necessarily includes the freedom to govern oneself.

Self

governance is thus one of the necessary features of autonomy. Kant conceptualized
moral self governance as autonomous persons willing and legislating moral laws. In the
public or political space, Kantian self governance is produced by reliance on principles of
right and democratic (Kant said republican) institutions. According to Daniel Philpott,
democracy is “the activity of governing oneself, of exercising one’s autonomy in the
political realm.”55 For purposes here, we can say that democracy is the fullest form of
exercise of autonomy, but that we may leave open other forms, so long as they meet the
basic conditions of autonomy promotion found in principles of justice. Justice is the
irreducible principle; though it would seem at least almost always to lead to a democratic
public order, I do not want to leave out the possibilities of other just orders. Many of our
life choices, from the most trivial of obtaining a driver’s license, to the most fundamental,
such as protection of basic liberties, are provided within the context of political authority.
All persons thus have a basic right to decide how they exercise their autonomy within the
political realm. We care about self determination in a conditional sense: if citizens of a
state value their self determination within that state and want regime change in that state,
to bring about a state that respects principles of justice, then outsiders ought to respect
those values.
The self determination condition should be understood hermeneutically. Its
hermeneutical features go to “determination.” Global pluralism is an obvious social fact.
The process of determining whether a population in a target state wants regime change is
an interpretive exercise.

The inquiry is in justifying regime change because it is

appropriate for the target state population because of its history and traditions, its social
54
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practices and the kind of community it is. It is a process of discovering the meaning of
regime change to the target state’s population, using what Georgia Warnke characterizes
as a hermeneutic circle:
We shall start by understanding a particular action or practice in terms of
our initial assumptions about the context of which it is a part, that is in
terms of an initial understanding of a framework of norms, values and
activities. We shall then deepen or even revise that understanding of the
framework in terms of a more thorough understanding of each of the parts
that compose the framework, including the action or practice we initially
tried to understand in terms of it. The goal is that of ironing smooth all the
wrinkles and glitches in our interpretation so that we attain a selfconsistent understanding in which our interpretation of the meaning of
each practice, norm and arrangement of the society confirms our
understanding of the whole and in which our understanding of the whole
substantiates our understanding of each part.56
Hermeneutic principles can assist in the search for a commitment by the target state
population to regime change. This task may not be as difficult as it seems. As Philpott
suggests in discussing the traditional concept of self determination, “if . . . the expressed
preference for self-government, not then identifying characteristics of the group, is
decisive, then the problem of finding objective criteria is avoided, at least in theory. The
standard is instead subjective: it simply does not matter which traits define a seceding
group; we know one when it announces, campaigns, or takes up arms for its dream of
self-determination.”57 Similar criteria may hold for the narrower kind of nationalitydriven self determination that is the subject of the Self Governance Principle, but we
should put the criteria through the hermeneutic process to assess their meaning.
An example of how to develop a hermeneutical understanding of self determination is
in the decision to invade Iraq in March 2003. I cannot provide a full interpretation of
events leading up to the war here; that would be the subject of entirely different paper.
But I can provide a start to such an account, to show how we might go about using
hermeneutics to understand whether the Iraqis as a national identity group met the
conditions for national self determination sufficient for the United States and its coalition
partners to overthrow the Hussein regime. At and near the time of the 2003 invasion,
Bush Administration representatives made a number of statements to the effect that the
56
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conditions in Iraq were similar to those in France and Germany after World War II and
that US troops would be “greeted as liberators.”58 Giving the Bush Administration the
benefit of the doubt, it apparently took only the first step in interpreting events in Iraq.
They went only so far as understanding a particular action or practice in terms of their
initial assumptions about the context of which it is a part; they apparently understood the
Iraqi historical and cultural context as something like that of Germany and Japan after
World War II. They failed to move on to deeper or revised understandings or to seeking
coherence of the parts with the whole. Francis Fukuyama seems to have gotten it right in
his critique of Bush Administration policy:
Prior to the Iraq War, there were many reasons for thinking that building a
democratic Iraq was a task of complexity that would be nearly
unmanageable. Some reasons had to do with the nature of Iraqi society:
the fact that it would be decompressing rapidly from totalitarianism, its
ethnic divisions, the role of politicized religion, the society’s propensity
for violence, its tribal structure and the dominance of extended kin and
patronage networks, and its susceptibility to influence from other parts of
the Middle East that were passionately anti-American.59
The Bush Administration thus made some crucial misinterpretations of the conditions for
regime change in Iraq.60
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The second condition identified in the Self Governance Principle is that post-conflict
reform should bring about a legal system meeting the conceptual conditions for the law to
have practical authority to the target state’s population. The need for this condition arises
from the problems that Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks bring out on the implausibility
of using force to create a legitimate legal system. Plausible post-conflict reform requires
much more than simply creating legal institutions and writing laws.61

Stromseth,

Wippman and Brooks explain that “without a widely shared cultural commitment to the
idea of the rule of law, courts are just buildings, judges are just bureaucrats, and
constitutions are just pieces of paper.”62 They contend that post-conflict reform requires
the development within the target state population of a “widely shared cultural and
political commitment to the values underlying these institutions and codes.”63 How to
comply with these conditions after an external force conquers the target state is
problematic. They explain that “in post intervention societies . . . the tension between the
law’s appeal to reason and the realities of coercion is particularly glaring, and greatly
complicates efforts to create rule of law cultures.”64 They continue:
Possession of superior force thus creates both opportunities and challenges
for interveners. On the one hand, interveners have perhaps a unique
capacity to foster positive change. . . . But interveners can compel
cooperation – or at least the outward forms of cooperation – they can
easily spearhead the creation of new institutions or reformed legal codes. .
. . But in other ways, possession of superior force only increases the
difficulties faced by interveners eager to help foster a rule of law culture.
The example of the intervention itself tends to undercut subsequent
arguments made by interveners about the value of reason and legal process
over force, particularly if the intervention was of contested legality, as in
Iraq. If the intervention itself is read as an object lesson about the
irrelevance of law as a constraint on power, people on the ground may be
particularly resistant to efforts to convince them of the virtues of the rule
of law. . . .65
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Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks are not doing philosophy and admit what they say “is
not intended to stand up to rigorous philosophical critiques.”66
But they identify an important insight that analytical legal philosophers have been
exploring for some time. Here we have the opportunity to make analytical jurisprudence
an “applied” philosophy. It is by now beyond serious challenge that force is not the
source of legal authority. HLA Hart began the twentieth century discussion of the
practical authority of law in his distinguishing between being obliged and being
obligated.67 The source of practical authority that Hart identified are those found in
socially accepted hierarchies. Social acceptance brings legitimacy to these hierarchies.
People have attitudes about being obligated by the law. Law makes a normative demand
or claim on free and rational persons who have the capacity to respond to reasons. Legal
reasons come from the conventions that produce the law and not from the content of the
reasons themselves (as they do in morality), but that does not matter for purposes of
understanding the nature of the practical authority of law. People develop an attitude
about what officials offer as law as the right kind of reason to act in a certain way. Legal
authority is possible because of a kind of shared conviction of what law is. So in
analytical jurisprudence we have a theory about law that is based on the idea of
normative commitment and which respects the autonomy of persons. This is a way of
conceptualizing legal obligation in much the same way as moral philosophers
conceptualize moral obligation – as something that makes legitimate claims on us.
With these understandings at hand, the practical authority condition is necessary in
any moral justification of the use of force to bring about regime change. It is at least
implausible to suggest that a legitimate state, that is, one that follows principles of justice,
could ever form without its legal system having the kind of practical authority that
analytical jurisprudence elucidates for law. This is not the place to restate what has
already been worked out by others on how the practical authority of the law is a
necessary condition for human freedom. If law makes a legitimate claim to obedience on
persons, in a way that respects the freedom of each person, then the practical authority
conditions must be met.68
66
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The final component of the Self Governance Principle is its formulation as a
collective duty. The literature to-date on humanitarian intervention conceptualizes moral
grounds for that kind of intervention as either a justification or permission to intervene or
as an obligation to intervene. The “majority” of the literature, if there is such a thing,
conceptualizes the moral grounds for humanitarian intervention as a question of
justification or permission.69 Here we face a possible difficulty. Force is usually justified
as a response to wrong.70 In the humanitarian intervention context, the wrong is clear;
human rights atrocities are in the process of being committed or are imminent. What is
the wrong in regime change intervention? More precisely, what is the wrong creating a
collective moral duty to intervene for regime change purposes?
The strategy employed to address these concerns is to see if the Self Governance
Principle can be upheld in a contractualist framework, using T.M. Scanlon’s form of
contractualism. How does the Self Governance Principle fare in a contractualist account?
Can no one reasonably reject it? I want to use Scanlon’s contractualism to understand
whether the Principle is well formed as a collective moral duty of legitimate states.
A key feature of the Scanlonian form of contractualism is its conception of reasonable
rejection.71 I cannot restate Scanlon’s account here in detail but I identify some of its
features, particularly if they might become obstacles to supporting a duty in the Self
Governance Principle. A summary statement of contractualism’s formula of universal
law of sorts is that moral action is governed by principles for the general regulation of
behavior that are not reasonably rejectable by persons with the same motivations as to the
appropriate reasons for rejection. In contractualist terms, legitimate states, or more
properly their citizens, and target state citizens, should regulate themselves by principles
that are not reasonably rejectable to every one of them in each state. Only individuals on
their own behalf can object to principles. Interpersonal aggregation of burdens and
benefits is thus barred save in limited circumstances.72 What counts as a reason for
69
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acceptance or rejection of a principle depends on the strength of the reason alone. A
weaker opposing reason cannot outweigh a stronger reason simply because more people
accept the weaker reason. So, in search of a principle no one can reasonably reject, we
compare the merits of reasons to accept or reject the principle, and we restrict ourselves
to comparing the reasons only of individuals. All of this entails “that any individual can
reasonably reject a principle when she can propose an alternative principle to which no
other single individual has an equally strong objection.”73

Reasons include the

consideration of burdens and benefits on individuals. Well being is an acceptable reason,
but it is not the only one, and it is tempered by the concept of reasonableness and by the
prohibition on interpersonal aggregation. We cannot reasonably reject a principle only
because of the burdens it imposes on us, but that principle applies to all other individuals
too. The reasonableness of our rejections requires a judgment about the suitability of
principles that must be based in mutual recognition from a moral perspective. The
process of selecting principles works like reflective equilibrium, though I do not want to
get into precise comparisons here. The end of the process of principle selection is to
identify a principle that no one can reasonably reject and that has the weakest individual
objection to it.
The most direct way to access the contractualist moral argument in the Self
Governance Principle is to examine the burdens and benefits of both target and
intervening state citizens. The burdens and benefits of many citizens in the intervening
and target states are similar. I do not group persons, but I address the account to
representative citizens of the states in question. My interest is in finding the citizens who
will suffer the greatest burdens, as they may well have reasons to reject the Self
Governance Principle.
The burdens on intervening states’ citizens are substantial. The intervening states’
citizens who will be most burdened will be those who have to fight in the conflict and

affairs is equivalent, but one situation involves harm to more people than the other. In such a situation, it is
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their families.74 Also burdened in the intervening states are persons who suffer resource
deprivation to fund the intervention.

Armed conflicts typically involve massive

expenditures from the public budget, diverting scarce resources from domestic projects
designed to benefit a state’s citizens, to benefit foreigners.75
Given these burdens, it would seem that intervening states’ citizens could reasonably
reject the Self Governance Principle. Three features of the Principle, however, may make
it unlikely to be reasonably rejectable to the intervening states’ citizens.
First, the duty is collective. Making the duty collective limits the sacrifice the
population of each state must provide.76

Collectivity mitigates the problem of

disproportionate costs to any single state’s citizens.

Collectivity also mitigates the

problem of disproportionate benefits. The citizens of all states generally have reason to
reject single state obligations because they could provide powerful states with
opportunities for strategic behavior. The collectivity of the duty specified in the Self
Governance Principle eliminates or at least mitigates disproportionate benefits inuring to
any single state. If the duty is collective, states cannot take advantage of their power, but
neither will they bear disproportionate burdens.

The collective feature of the duty

facilitates global stability.77
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Second, the collective duty is indirect in the sense of requiring assistance through the
formation of just and efficacious international institutions to do the work of intervention.
It is a duty of justice something like what Rawls proposes individuals have in domestic
societies: “the most important natural duty is that to support and to further just
institutions.”78 Rawls elaborates the duty as having two parts: “first, we are to comply
with and to do our share in just institutions when they exist and apply to us; and second,
we are to assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not exist, at least
when this can be done with little cost to ourselves.”79 Buchanan extends the natural duty
of justice to the international realm. A contractualist account can support that duty.
Regardless of whether a Rawlsian basic structure or any other form of social cooperation
exists at the international level, each person has a “limited obligation to help create
structures that provide all persons with access to just institutions.”80 Buchanan explains
that the “natural” modifier means that the duty applies to us as persons. We can limit the
duty with the restriction that it applies to persons with means; we cannot ask the poorest
in developing countries to discharge this duty.

Buchanan’s duty rests on Kantian

considerations appealing to a contractualist view. It rests partly on what Buchanan calls
the Moral Equality Principle: “all persons are entitled to equal respect and concern.”81 In
Kantian terms, all persons are to be treated as ends.82 In addition, the duty of justice
relies on Buchanan’s Equal Regard Principle, that “treating persons with equal concern
and respect requires helping to ensure that they are treated justly.”83

Just legal

institutions are required for people to be treated justly.84 All of these principles are
reflected in the contractualist-based Self Governance Principle. The self determination
condition in the Self Governance Principle covers much of the conceptual territory. The
Self Governance Principle specifies the conditions inherent in any form of Kantian
influenced contractualist argument: recognition respect. To put it more broadly, self
78
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determination is what deontological moral theories are all about.
Third, substantial benefits may accrue to the intervening states’ citizens under the
Self Governance Principle. They have reason to accept the Principle because legitimate
states tend not to be aggressive or start wars.

This point was discussed in the

Introduction.
The target state’s citizens should reasonably accept the Self Governance Principle as
the only alternative to their dilemma. They live in an illegitimate state, one that fails to
conform to principles of justice. The self determination condition specified in the Self
Governance Principle guarantees that they are vitally interested in regime change. The
practical authority condition specified in the Self Governance Principle protects them
from the use of force to impose an illegitimate legal and constitutional order upon them.
Unless the citizens of the target state receive military assistance, they will continue to be
subjected to illegitimacy in their political life. They will be severely burdened by their
lack of freedom.
Some target state citizens will suffer substantial burdens as a result of intervention.
Certainly we should take into account that many in the target state may die or suffer
serious injury as a result of military action. For them, the collective duty argument does
not mitigate the considerable burdens them may suffer, and, it is not only their military
that is in harm’s way. The problem of harm to innocents poses a formidable moral
difficulty for any use of force: how can a principle not be reasonably rejectable to those
“civilians” – those who do not take part in the fighting - who will be killed or injured?
They are being asked to die or face serious injury to support state legitimacy. The answer
to this question is partly in the concept of a generic reason. Though contractualism
specifies no veil of ignorance, the reasons to be evaluated are not those of identified
persons but of persons in general. We have to rely not on reasons of specific individuals
but on “commonly available information about what people have reason to want.”85 We
look to what persons have reason to want “in virtue of their situation, characterized in
general terms.”86 These parameters advise us to determine well being on the basis of
“interests that everyone has reason to be concerned with.”87 Scanlon provides as an
85
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example that people have “strong reasons to want to avoid bodily injury . . . and to have
control over what happens to their own bodies.”88 So, we must specify even generic
reasons restrictively if they involve death or bodily injury. We do not rely on the reasons
of individuals who are fully situated in the armed conflict, but on generic reasons of
citizens of the target state. The Self Governance Principle cannot be reasonably rejected
by the target state civilians if the following limitations are taken into account. First, the
Principle in no way limits state obligations to adhere to laws of war, including
proportionality and necessity principles.

Second, as explained in the Introduction,

nothing said in this paper is intended to suggest that military force is to be other than as a
last resort. The last resort concept ties into the necessity concept; there must be not
alternatives to use of force. Scanlon mentions alternatives or the lack of them as relevant
to reasonable rejection.89 Finally, the Self Governance Principle specifies a significant
benefit for the citizens of the target state, who, by the success conditions mandated in the
Principle itself, are ready for national self determination in the form of a legitimate state,
that is, one that will begin to comply with principles of justice.
In summary, we can compare reasons for rejection and acceptance of the Self
Governance Principle by each person in the target and intervening states, and likely
conclude that the Principle is not reasonably rejectable by anyone. Of course, to reach
this conclusion, we have to assume that persons have similar reasons based on similar
circumstances, but we can still posit worst case scenarios, such as examining the case of
persons who will be casualties in any intervention, in the assessment. We can plausibly
conclude that objections to the Principle are the weakest possible. It is doubtful that
anyone can propose an alternative principle to which someone else has a weaker
objection. First, we can ask whether an alternative principle that stops short of the use of
force, would be more reasonable.

Target state citizens can reasonably reject an

alternative principle that bans the use of force, lawfully used, as a last resort, because
they will then have no opportunity to change their illegitimate state into a legitimate one,
in circumstances in which such a change is warranted by definition, in the conditions set
forth in the Self Governance Principle. Moreover, force is to be used only as a last resort
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and must comply with the laws of war. A good many intervening and target state citizens
who would be harmed by use of force can obviously reasonably reject an alternative
principle that does not so restrain the use of force.

If we modify the collectivity

constraints in the Self Governance Principle, to place the duty on single states, the
citizens of intervening states would have reason to reject the Principle; a less burdensome
collective Principle can be specified. Even citizens of non-intervening states would have
reason to reject a Principle specifying a singular duty, since such a Principle could be
destabilizing. If we modify the indirect duty constraints in the Self Governance Principle
and require states to intervene directly, the intervening states’ citizens would have reason
to reject the Principle because of the great burdens placed on them by such a direct albeit
collective duty. The attempts to produce successful collective action without institutions
would be overly burdensome. Finally, removing the self determination and practical
authority conditions would make the Self Governance Principle reasonably rejectable by
many persons in both intervening and target states, who will suffer greatly from an
unwarranted use of force to bring about a regime change in circumstances in which it is
unlikely to successful.
The Self Governance Principle does not specify supererogatory action. To the extent
criteria for what supererogatory action is can be agreed upon, the Self Governance
Principle does not meet the criteria. In very general terms, supererogatory action is
action beyond moral duty and not morally required but morally praiseworthy. The Self
Governance Principle does not specify such acts.

It does not specify morally

praiseworthy action alone. Surely, obligatory action is morally praiseworthy, but it is
more than that; its central feature is the demand in its content; it makes a moral demand
on us we cannot refuse. The Self Governance Principle does just that. It specifies a duty
of justice, of what is due the target state citizens, when the tightly specified conditions in
the Principle are met. The Principle advises when justice requires persons to support
collectively the actions of a national population to bring just institutions to their state. It
does not specify a kind of exemplary peacemaking. Intervention to bring legitimacy in
the form of justice to a state without meeting the two conditions specified in the Self
Governance Principle may be seen as exemplary but it is more likely to be seen as folly
or worse, given the harm it could wreak on many people, immoral. The saving feature of
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the Self Governance Principle is its strict specification of narrow conditions. The failure
to use collective force to assist target state citizens to establish a legitimate state when
they have expressed their desire for such a change would be to deny an improvement in
the human condition that is uniquely valued: self governance. As explained above, self
governance is central to human autonomy. We can rightly be blamed for failing to assist
peoples who present to us the strict conditions for political self governance identified in
the Self Governance Principle.
Resistance to the duty specified in the Self Governance Principle is likely to come
from confusion that seems to exist in international law, in which all uses of force seem to
receive the classification of a justification or permission, if not supererogation. The error
may have originated in the legal analysis of use of force questions. The main source of
confusion about talk of a “right” to engage in the use of force may come from the
language of international law, stuck in the realm of politics and respect for state
sovereignty. The result is inappropriate extension of language initially used to describe
the “right” of states to use force in a more traditional form, that of the right to use force in
self-defense.90 The terminology of self-defense is similar to that used in the criminal law
on the right of self defense as a complete justification of an act that would otherwise be
criminal. In the criminal law, it makes little sense to speak of an “obligation” of self
defense, unless one is willing to conceptualize the discussion around duties to oneself.
Certainly a moral duty to oneself of self defense exists, but the focus of the criminal law
is in providing justification for exercising that moral duty in a way that does not result in
harm to others. The terminology does not transfer well to entities, such as governments,
which may owe obligations to their populaces to defend them against harm by other
states, entities and persons. In any event, given that states have legal personality in
international law, we use “right” when we refer to the right of a state to defend itself.91
These mistakes seem to have worked their way into discussions of humanitarian
intervention, an admittedly even better candidate for obligatory action. Luban and others
seek a “wider range of permissiveness” in which to act in the right cases of humanitarian
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intervention.92 Luban argues that humanitarian intervention may be “morally vital” but
does not rise to the level of a moral duty. He contends that not all moral reasons rise to
the level of obligation: “after all, not every reason for doing something is an obligation to
do it.”93 He argues that bystander shame, not blame or moral guilt, is the reason that
prompts us to intervene for humanitarian reasons. But taking action because you are
ashamed is not taking supererogatory action. To take action to avoid shame is not
praiseworthy or above and beyond the call of duty. Luban’s account suggests that
humanitarian intervention is something in the nature of a virtuous act, or at best a duty of
beneficence. Certainly we believe there is a failure of moral accountability greater than
shame or the failure to be charitable when we consider the recent spectacular failures of
inaction by the international community in Rwanda and Sudan. The proper reaction is
perhaps both shame and blame. If the international community were to have intervened
in Rwanda or Sudan to stop the slaughters, they would not be doing something above and
beyond moral duty. Such intervention is not simply praiseworthy and valuable; it is
required.
Finally, does the Self Governance Principle contradict the Human Rights Principle?
In the prior part, I argued that self governance does not justify humanitarian intervention.
But I did not rule out use of force justified under some more finely grained principle.
The Self Governance Principle is just that. It is an attempt to provide for a sufficiently
determinate collective duty. The Self Governance Principle may be justified with a
human rights argument, but I do not provide that argument here. The contractualist
justification upon which the Self Governance Principle rests connects directly into
notions of moral obligation.

CONCLUSION
Articulating a moral principle obligating states to use force not necessarily in
response to force is difficult. Though the compelling features of other uses of force, such
as mass atrocities or protection of vulnerable populations or self defense, may be absent
in a regime change context, they do not have to be. Civil war, for example, may be
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present in any process of national self determination. A civil war may send credible
signals that the self determination conditions specified in the Self Governance Principle
are met, but civil war is not explicit as a condition to make the Principle operative. What
makes the Self Governance Principle morally attractive is its extreme limitations. The
self determination and practical authority conditions provide for a very narrow range of
application, limiting the ill effects of the use of military force on state legitimacy. The
conditions require in all cases of regime change that legitimate moral and legal orders
trump coercive order. The obligations the Self Governance Principle specifies, moreover,
are not as great as they may seem at first blush; they in the main operate as a collective
duty on legitimate states to form just and efficacious institutions to assist the populations
of illegitimate states when the time is right.
Iraq was not a good candidate for regime change under the Self Governance
Principle. There was no real collective action, force was not a last resort, the conditions
for national self determination were not met, and the conditions for establishing a legal
order meeting the practical authority conditions were not met. Iraq is a moral failure.
The Self Governance Principle does not sanction preventive war. The focus of the
Principle is internal not external. The Principle specifies conditions for assisting people
in governing themselves in a state that follows principles of justice. It does not specify
conditions for intervention to prevent attacks on outsiders, though this may well be an
important yet incidental benefit of the move to state legitimacy.
As explained at the beginning, the Self Governance Principle does not reflect the
current state of international law. At most it could serve as a moral principle to inform
the content of the legal rules yet to be specified. I agree with Buchanan, who says:
Violations of fundamental rules of existing international law, such as the
prohibition against preventive war and against any use of force that does
not qualify as self-defense and lacks Security Council authorization, are
irresponsible, unless they are accompanied by a sincere effort to construct
superior international legal structures to replace those they damage or
render obsolete.94
We should take Buchanan’s guidance seriously. We do not want state action to harm the
legitimacy of international law. Buchanan’s point takes us back to the beginning of the
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paper. Any armed intervention must itself be legitimate, having clear legal justification,
and also must be seen to be legitimate, to be able to accomplish legitimate goals within a
state.95 Might does not make right.
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